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The morality of "Right-to-Work" laws has been seriously questioned
by responsible authorities in the field of labor law. The present article
is intended to delineate the problem and to point out some factual cir-
cumstances in which the author believes the moral justification of
"Right-to-Work" laws to be arguable.
The July issue of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER will present the
point of view of those who take issue with the position of the present
author.
Morality of Right-To-Work Laws
BERNARD H. FITZPATRICKt
N THIS YEAR'S SESSIONS of many of our state legislatures, "Right-to-
Work" bills were introduced. This type of legislation,' which is now
the law in eighteen of our states, 2 has been subjected to constant attack
on the ground that it is immoral. The seriousness of the charge, the wide-
spread adoption of such laws and the efforts to defeat their spread to
other states justify a brief examination of the moral aspects of the
right to work.
tMember of the New York Bar.
I Louisiana has a typical "Right-to-Work" statute.
Declaration of Public Policy. It is hereby declared to be the public policy of
Louisiana that the right of a person or persons to work shall not be denied or
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union
or labor organization. LA. REV. STAT. §881 (Supp. 1954).
Some states have "Right-to-Work" provisions embodied in their constitutions, e.g.,
Florida.
[R]ight to work. . . .The right of persons to work shall not be denied or
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union,
or labor organization; provided, that this clause shall not be construed to
deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a labor organization
or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer. FLA. CONST.,
Declaration of Rights §12.
2 Four states have constitutional provisions: ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §35 [ARIZ. CODE
ANN. §56-1302 et seq. (Supp. 1952)]; ARK. CONST. AMEND. XXXIV (1) [ARK.
STAT. ANN. §81-201 et seq. (1947)]; FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights §12; NEB.
CONST. art. XV, §13 [NEaB. REV. STAT. §§48-217, 48-219 (1952)].
Fourteen states have statutory provisions: ALA. CODE tit. 26, §375 (Supp.
1953); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 54, §§54-902 et seq., 54-9922 (Supp. 1954); IOWA
CODE ANN. c. 736A (1950); LA. REV. STAT. §§881-888 (Supp. 1954); LAWS OF
Miss. 1954, c. 249, §1; NEV. COMP. LAWS §10473 (Hillyer, 1929); N. C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §95-78 et seq. (Michie, 1950); N. D. REV. CODE tit. 34, §34-0114 (Supp.
1953); S. C. CODE ANN, tit. 40, §40-46 (Supp. 1954); S. D. CODE §17.1101 (Supp.
1952); TENN. CODE ANN. §§11412.8-11412 (Williams, Supp. 1954); TEX. STAT.
arts. 5154c, 5207a (Vernon, 1947); UTAH CODE ANN. §34-16-1 et seq. (Supp. 1955);
VA. CODE ANN. tit. 40, §40-68 et seq. (1947), §40-74.1 et seq. (Supp. 1954).
THE CATHOLIC LAWYER
It may not be quite proper for a lawyer
to undertake such an examination; he lacks
competence in the field of moral disputation;
he violates the
ancient injunction
laid upon him "Put
not thy sickle into
the field of dread
theologie." The
only excuse that
can be offered is
that half of the
question lies in the
field of law; even
the moralist, toB. H. FITZPATRICK pass judgment
upon a law must know what that law is and
what its implications are, and if the lawyer
speaks out on a question of law as to the
bearing of the law on a moral issue he is in
no worse case than the moralist who
speaks out on an issue of morals involving
a question of law. 3
Because the lawmaker must generalize,
there is hardly any specific piece of social
legislation which in all its applications will
completely realize the moral ideal. The
best the legislator can hope to accomplish is
a rough concordance between the legis-
lation and moral principle as applied to
the great mass and the numerically signi-
ficant components of the mass of people
affected. For reasons which we shall pres-
ently set forth, the "Right-to-Work" laws in
the majority of their applications are per-
fectly in accord with sound morality and
indeed positively required by sound mor-
ality: There are, however, numerically
significant groups of workingmen whose
3 Cf. Quadragesimo Anno, paras. 41, 42, Two
BASIC SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS 111, 112 (The Cath-
olic University of America Press, 1943).
legitimate moral rights are destroyed by
such laws (and by the Taft-Hartley Act).
The indicated course of conduct for the
conscientious legislator is, first, to seek to
amend the "Right-to-Work" laws to pre-
serve the moral rights of the minorities
involved and then to vote for the "Right-
to-Work" laws as so amended. It thus
becomes important to discover precisely
what moral principles are involved and
precisely how they bear on the legitimate
objectives of labor unions. The question
"Are 'Right-to-Work' laws moral?" over-
simplifies the problem. More accurately,
the question is this: "Wherein do they
accord with and wherein do they depart
from sound morality?"
The general pattern of "Right-to-Work"
laws is that they forbid under various sanc-
tions, contracts, understandings, or policies
of employers, making membership or non-
membership in a union a condition of em-
ployment. We might note that there is a
practical problem inherent in maintaining
the employees' right to choose a union in
the face of closed and union shop agree-
ments to which the critics do not essay an
answer.
4
In deference to those critics who have
been at some pains to point out that such
laws guarantee no one a job, that fact is
stated here, although, unless there were a
misconception about the "right to work"
in the public mind there would seem to be
little point in mentioning the fact.5
4 Cf. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338
U.S. 335 (1949).
5 It is argued by some that since the right to
work is a right of imperfect or inchoate type,
i.e., it depends upon the concurrence of an em-
ployer, it cannot be called a "right" but is merely a
privilege, hence there is no right which can be
violated by shop cloture. As a purely semantic
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To begin with, no one questions that
man has a moral right to work; indeed
* . .man is born to labor as the bird to
fly...- 6 and it would be most difficult to
deny him the right to do what his very na-
ture calls upon him to do. Many laws tak-
ing many different forms recognize man's
right to work; and no one has dissented
from them on moral grounds. There may
be mentioned the anti-discrimination laws,
the "yellow dog" laws, the labor relations
laws and the second injury provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation laws.
proposition this might easily be rebutted, e.g., the
"right" to marry depends upon such concurrence,
so does my property "right" in a grain future
contract which would be valueless unless I could
find a buyer. More realistically, however, whether
my rights or my privileges are involved would
seem to make little difference when the question
under discussion is how far an interference by
another, especially a stranger to the essential con-
currence, might be arbitrary. Some of the pro-
ponents of this view appear to be confused as to
the correlation of right and duty, believing that
the correlative duty is to be looked for in the
concurring party whereas the correct notion of
correlation is that a duty in a given person gives
rise to a correlative right in the same person; if
others are involved in the exercise of the right
they may be under a positive or negative obliga-
tion to respect the right, but their obligation has
no bearing on the existence of the right tit sic.
6 Quadregesitno Anno, op. cit. supra note 3, at
para. 61, p. 129. Job opportunity may not be
unreasonably restricted. Id. at para. 74, pp. 135,
137. The necessity for work antedated the fall of
Adam. Rerun Novarum, para. 27, Two BASIC
SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS 21, 23 (The Catholic Uni-
versity of America Press, 1943). One point of
view regards the right to work as not embrac-
ing a "right to work in the employ of another,"
the basic argument being that the right depends
upon the duty to work which is non-existent in
the case of persons of independent means. The
quoted matter in the main text appears to relate
to work in employee status, but even if it did not,
the fact that a right is not universal is no criterion
of its existence.
But, it is said, the right to work is not
absolute, and this we cannot gainsay.
Neither is the right to life absolute; it
must yield to superior rights in others, for
example, the right of the nation to wage
war and conscript its citizens to fight and
die therein; 7 it must yield also to equal
rights in others, for example, a seaman in
charge of a lifeboat may not throw passen-
gers overboard to lighten an overburdened
boat so that the remainder may be saved.8
Just as, however, the fact that the right to
life is not absolute will not justify promis-
cuous killing, so the fact that the right to
work is not absolute will not justify pro-
miscuous interference with the right to
work.
When we say that a right is not absolute
all we really mean is that the right may be
invaded or denied for reasonable cause,
and reasonable cause, in turn, means the
existence of equal or superior rights in
others. As one of our speculative jurists
put it, "My right to swing my arm stops at
the end of my neighbor's nose."
For our present purposes we are going
to make the assumption that a great num-
ber of rights inferior in quality to an as-
serted individual right may nonetheless
constitute a superior right. For example,
the paid fireman is often under a moral
duty to risk his life even though only the
property rights of his neighbors are at
stake. It is obvious, of course, that just as
the right to life outranks the right to work
because the latter is merely a derivative of
7 Paralleled in the spiritual order by martyrdom;
the right to life gives way to the superior right
of God to command fidelity.
8 U.S. v. Holmes, Fed. Cas. No. 15,383 (C.C.
E.D. Pa. 1842). Gilbert's "Yarn of the Nancy
Belle" is good rhyme but poor morals.
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the former, so the right to organize and
bargain collectively and the right to asso-
ciate in trade unions are subordinate in
rank to the right to work because they are
purely ancillary to the right to work and
exist solely for the purpose of protecting
the value of the right to work. If therefore,
we examined the question solely on a qual-
itative basis the matter would end right
here; in case of conflict, the qualitatively
superior right to work would always pre-
vail over the lesser right to associate in
trade unions.
We will make one further assumption.
That is that in cases where the whole right
is not taken, but merely some relatively
minor interference with the right is pro-
posed, a relatively greater interest in a
lesser right in others may also constitute a
superior right. It is on this principle that
quarantine laws operate; I am deprived of
liberty, though I be perfectly healthy, that
others may be free of disease.
The first question, then, which the legis-
lator must answer is whether the rights of
the union are superior to the right to work;
but that is not the only question. It must be
determined whether the right of the union
to insist upon a shop cloture is an absolute
right. Clearly it is not. If those in posses-
sion and control of a field of employment
had an unqualified right to exclude all
others at will, Pope Leo XIII could not
have condemned as he did those labor or-
ganizations committed to religious and civil
subversion which
... after having possession of all available
work... contrive that those who refuse to
join with them [in subversion] will be forced
by want to pay the penalty. 9
9 Rerum Novaruni, op. cit. supra note 6, at para.
74, p. 69. The word "possession" in the quoted
The system which permits such exclu-
sion is characterized by the Pope as one of
"unjust and intolerable oppression." 10
If shop cloture were an absolute right to
be exercised at the will of the workers in
possession, the Pope could have con-
demned the subversive committments of
the groups in question, but he could not
have called unjust and bppressive their ex-
clusion from work of those who refused to
join in subversion. The closed shop and the
union shop are, therefore, morally indif-
ferent meanis which must be judged virtu-
ous or vicious or neutral, from the
legitimacy, depravity or neutrality of their
objectives or their resultants. Nor are they
evil only in the context of subversive mo-
tives; they are evil in every case where they
are undertaken for motives or productive
of results which are evil by any moral test.
The structures of corruption on the New
York waterfront, at the racetracks and else-
where, could never have been erected with-
out the closed shop.
matter might better have been "control." "Pos-
session" normally signifies the power to control
coupled with the right to control. The original
uses "occupata" which would not signify right.
10 Ibid. The word "intolerable" has also acquired
too passive a meaning to render "non Jerunda
oppressione" accurately; the passage calls for
active opposition to take the form of dual union-
ism. Some interpret Rerum Novarum para. 74 as
importing a moral obligation to join a union,
undoubtedly a sound construction in the particular
circumstances but an inadequate foundation for
arguing the existence of any general duty to join.
It may be inferred from arguments advanced later
in this article that a man practicing a craft may be
under a moral obligation to observe craft stand-
ards to the point of joining the craft union; so
also in strict industrial unionism (e.g., coal, gar-
ments) there may be such a moral obligation. But
in industries not organized along either of these
lines, e.g., steel, oil, auto manufacturing, there
would be no such obligation.
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The second question which the legislator
must answer, then, is whether, assuming
that the rights of the union may in some
cases be superior to the right to work, so
that an interference with the latter is justifi-
able, the proposed form of the interference
provides adequate safeguards against abuse.
In this connection, it should be remarked
that the legislator should not permit him-
self to be deceived as to the magnitude of
the interference of shop cloture with the
right to work. The notion, carefully fos-
tered by advocates of shop cloture, that the
rights of "only a few holdouts" as com-
pared to the "great majority" are involved
is completely false because shop cloture
binds not only the minority but everyone."1
All that can be said in favor of this argu-
ment is "volenti non fit injuria," to which
it may be answered that often the state
must do the thinking for the improvident.
When the state legislator seeks an an-
swer to these two questions he is confronted
first by the dichotomy of Federal and State
power; his power to legislate with respect
to interstate labor is restricted but his
power to legislate for intrastate labor is
not impaired. He first turns to observing
the area of power left him by Federal law.
Congress has left to the state the power
to restrict further an institution which is, in
popular parlance, called the "union shop,"
although the resemblance of the "statutory
union shop" to the pre-Taft-Hartley "union
shop" is somewhat nebulous. Actually, the
"statutory union shop" has nothing to do
with union membership, except that the
union may not charge a dissenter any more
than it charges its own members.' 2 Con-
11 The fact that "preferential" and "proportional"
shops exist is obviously not a valid consideration.
12 Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.
2d 100R cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
gress has said in effect to the state legisla-
tures:
We are giving the union the power to
tax (and no more) under the limitations,
first, that the tax upon non-members shall
not exceed the tax upon members; second,
that the employers consent; and third, that
a tender of the tax shall discharge all
obligations. We remit to you, Mr. State
Legislator, the questions of whether such
taxes may be collected in invitum in your
state, and if so, to what extent and under
what sanction. 13
The moral question facing the state legis-
lator in this area is no more, no less than
the question of whether the right to work
should be interfered with to the extent of
permitting the collection of a tax thereon.
Since the interference with the right to work
is not complete, but rather nominal, and
since there is an equal right in others to
spread equitably over the members of a
given unit the financial burdens, of that
unit 14 the question becomes one of which
13 It is said that Senator Taft favored the "agency
shop," wherein a "service charge" is collected by
the incumbent bargaining agent but there are no
other membership requirements, but was deterred
from an enactment in that form for fear of consti-
tutional objection. Logically, if Congress could
create a "bargaining unit," which, in a very real
sense is a "municipal corporation," [a true and
genuine organ of the state, Quadregesitno Anno,
para. 93, Two BASIC SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS 151 (The
Catholic University of America Press, 1943))
having sovereign powers exercisable in invituin
it could invest that corporation with the power to
tax. Legally, however, there are possibilities of
constitutional objection on many grounds, and as
a competent constitutional lawyer, Senator Taft
may have sought to give the enactment the aura
of accepted practice. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1855).
14 Rerumn Novarut, para. 50, Two BASIC SOCIAL
ENCYCLICALS 45 (The Catholic University of
America Press, 1943). An employee is a "citizen
of a bargaining unit." See also Quadregesimo
Anno, op. cit. supra note 13 at para. 92, p. 149, for
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of two approximately equal rights should
prevail. A small diminution of the right to
work is to be suffered that an enhancement
of the value of the right to work may be
brought about. You tax a man to build a
road past his property; the road, when
built, enhances the value of the property.
We conclude then that as applied to the
residual Federal field, the "Right-to-Work"
laws are in the category of "morally indif-
ferent" legislation; a legislator is morally
free to vote for or against such legislation.
The existence of a union is not at stake;
the principle of unionism is not at stake; 15
only the union revenues are at stake and
the legislator might well conclude that
since the revenues are at stake only to the
degree in which the particular union has
specific approval of a union taxation scheme where
the union is the exclusive representative, though
the union may not compel membership. Quaere
whether the union is entitled to anything more
than the reasonable expense of conducting the
activities of the bargaining unit and whether an
employee who 'might not want the benefits of
union-operated welfare funds should be compelled
to pay therefore.
15 An attack on the "Right-to-Work" laws is based
on the apprehension that they tend to undermine
unionism. It is true that they undermine craft and
strict industrial unions as pointed out infra herein.
It may be true that where the law of a particular
jurisdiction fails to recognize the principle of the
"exclusive bargaining agent" other types of union
may be jeopardized (see note 26 infra). But that
a "Right-to-Work" law per se has any such ten-
dency appears to be contrary to the available
statistical evidence, e.g., the Railway Labor Act,
prior to 1949, incorporated the substance of
"Right-to-Work" laws, yet organization progressed
between 1926 and 1949. Also, in general industry,
so long as closed and union shops were the only
organizing methods, hardly any progress was
made outside the fields adaptable to craft and
strict industrial unionization; but when the Wagner
Act made the less restrictive device of the "exclu-
sive bargaining agent" available, organization
commenced to flourish.
failed to inspire confidence in its electorate,
he will not assist by permitting the collec-
tion of a tax in invitum. Or he may well
apply the normal considerations which con-
trol the award of taxing power to any pub-
lic corporation; for example, he might rely
on the analogy of giving a sewer district
the right to tax on a frontage or valuation
or acreage basis, even though some owners
will not use the sewers, or the analogy of
a school district having the power to tax
all, though many landowners will educate
their children privately. From the moral
viewpoint his answer to the practical ques-
tions involved, whichever way it lies, will
not be wrong.
Nor need the legislator concern himself
greatly about the abuses which might oc-
cur in this Federal residual domain. True,
some improvements might be made in the
mechanics of dues collection such as re-
quiring a union to state in writing the
amount it claims as dues before a discharge
for non-payment or such as limiting its en-
forcement rights to a payroll deduction. 16
True, also, that where a union itself ad-
ministers pension plans, sick benefits and
the like out of monies collected as dues, it
should perhaps be regulated at least in this
aspect. But these problems do not loom so
large that morally the legislator is bound
to take notice of them. In the main it may
be said that the possible damage to the
individual is minimal, 17 and that if the tax-
payer to other governmental agencies were
as assured that his money will not be frit-
16 So far as permitted by Taft-Hartley Act §302,
61 STAT. 136, 157, 29 U.S.C. §566 (1947).
17 The Taft-Hartley Act itself contains safeguards
against oppressive taxation; among other things
it forbids excessive initiation fees. Oppressive
taxation is morally wrong. Rerum Novaruin, op.
cit. supra note 14 at para. 67, p. 63.
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tered away as the "union taxpayer" is that
his money will be well spent, he would be
well satisfied.
The problem of the legislator with re-
spect to intrastate labor is not as easily
solved. Congress has shouldered no part
of the moral responsibility in this field, the
state legislator must assume the entire bur-
den. However, he finds himself starting
with the same initial proposition, viz., that
the right to work being fundamental and
the rights designed to enhance its value
being merely derivative, the burden lies
upon him who would intrude upon the
right to work to show clearly what circum-
stances make a merely ancillary right
greater than the right from which it springs.
Of course the state is morally bound to
protect, at least by negative sanctions, the
right of men freely to associate. This right,
too, is qualified and not absolute; men, for
example, may form a partnership to deal in
commodities, but not a partnership to con-
duct the business of hijacking, 18 nor an
association for monopolization of a trade,
if unreasonable. 19 While the right of men
to associate for the improvement of their
condition as wage earners is a right which
must be respected under this principle, it
must also be observed, that the right of free
association is not a justification for com-
pulsory association nor for some, freely
associating, to compel others to join them.
It is abundantly clear that the moral right
18 Cf. Rerum Novarum, para. 72, Two BASIC
SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS 67 (The Catholic University
of America Press, 1943); Everet v. Williams, cited
in Michael Jeffrey and Co. v. Bamford, (1921)
2 K.B. 351, 355.
19Quadregesimo A4nno, paras. 105-110, Two
BASIC SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS 157, 159, 161 (The
Catholic University of America Press, 1943);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1910).
of association is a freedom, not a compul-
sion. What follows from this, of course, is
not that shop cloture is unjustified but that
shop cloture cannot be justified by the prin-
ciple of free association. We must look
elsewhere.
It has been noted above that the right
to work is not absolute. Let us now look at
two of the limitations on the right to work.
The first of these relates to man's duty to
himself and to his family and may be roughly
stated in the form that the right to work
does not justify a man in working for less
than a living wage. 20 The second relates to
man's duty to society-which includes both
his fellow worker and his employer and
the employers of his fellow workers, and
may be stated, again roughly, that man
may not exercise his right to work so
as to cause his fellow workers to accept
less than a living wage2 l nor so as to
ruin his own employer nor the competi-
tors of his employer. 22 For proper under-
standing of this last statement it should be
emphasized that the immorality lies in the
misuse of the right to work and not in the
damage which may incidentally be done to
another by a proper use of the right to
work; thus, if I agree to work for 371/
cents per hour and thereby cause another
to lose his 75 cent job, my act is immoral;
though if I agree to work for 75 cents an
20 Rerum Novarum, op. cit. supra note 18 at paras.
61, 63, pp. 57, 59; the same would apply to work-
ing conditions other than wages. Id. at paras. 56-
66, pp. 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61.
21 By "living wage" is meant more than a mere
subsistence. Quadregesimo Anno, op. cit. supra
note 19 at para. 71, pp. 133, 135. A "reasonable
wage" seems to be indicated reflecting, among
other things the "value added by labor in manu-
facture or service."
22 Quadregesimo Anno, op. cit. supra note 19 at
para. 72, p. 135.
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hour but use a tool which doubles effi-
ciency 23 and another 75 cent worker is
thereby displaced, my act is not immoral,
though the effect on production cost is the
same.
Workingmen, whether singly or in asso-
ciation, necessarily have a right to resist,
by all reasonable means, immoral acts of
other workers which affect adversely their
own right to work. If, therefore, it can be
demonstrated that some degree of shop
cloture is, in particular circumstances, an
apt means of protecting the reasonable
value of the right to work, then there is
good cause for men, in association, invad-
ing the right of others to work, but, of
course, only in the particular circumstances
and only to the degree necessary. Also, if
some legal institution or device less destruc-
tive of the right of others to work than
shop cloture is available, and practicable,
the legislator is bound to adopt that sub-
stitute device instead of shop cloture.
Here the inquiry becomes a factual one,
and there are two aspects to be considered.
The first aspect is the relationship between
the employee and his own employer. To
isolate this problem, assume that the em-
ployer in question is a manufacturer of a
product so hedged by patents that there is
no competition affecting the pricing of the
product and, consequently, no employee of
any other employer is competing for the
jobs via the product market. This manu-
facturer, which we shall call "Patent Para-
dise, Inc." requires a relatively steady work
force. 24 The only pressure therefore against
23 Efficiency is a moral duty of business. Ibid. It
follows that labor is morally bound to use the
more efficient method. Opera on Tour v. Weber,
285 N.Y. 348 (1941), is clearly in accord with
sound morality.
24 It is perhaps possible to justify shop cloture on
the employee of "Patent Paradise, Inc." is
the pressure of another direct bidder for
his job. But such pressure is readily con-
trolled by the ordinary labor contract with-
out any form of shop cloture; a rate is
normally specified for the job, wherefore
no lower rate can be paid; seniority, prior-
ity, discharge and force-reduction clauses
protect the employee adequately against
such pressure. If all employer-employee
situations were as serendipital as that of
"Patent Paradise, Inc." an invasion of the
right to work by shop cloture could not be
justified morally. 25 There is, however, one
moral question involved, viz., whether a
a single shop basis, in the rare cases where the
"gate hiring" or "shaping" system is still followed
so that the possibility of a steady working force
is destroyed. It would be prerequisite to the justi-
fication to show that the enterprise drew from a
pool of labor which regularly followed it as a
means of livelihood and cloture should not con-
tinue after the establishment of a seniority or
priority system. Crop pickers recruited locally
could not satisfy the "livelihood" test. Migrant
labor following a harvest would present a special
and difficult case on which the writer would prefer
to suspend judgment.
25 An argument advanced in support of shop
cloture is that if an employer and union agree
in collective bargaining that some form of cloture
would aid industrial relationships the cloture is
proper because the union and the employer are
charged with laying down rules for the common
good of the enterprise. The argument is perhaps
valid, but it merely identifies the persons in whom
the sovereign power resides without establishing
any criteria by which to judge the morality of their
act. Cf. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248
(1944); In the Matter of Monsieur Henri Wines,
Ltd., 44 NLRB 1310 (1942). Where the morality
is good or indifferent a legislative act is binding
within the scope of the legislative powers; but the
character of an immoral or ultra vires act is not
altered by the addition of a legislative fiat. In
connection with the argument itself the writer
would reserve judgment on the morality and the
wisdom of giving the employer any voice in a
matter of union organization.
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labor relations statute is reasonably re-
quired to achieve the stated result. If an
exclusive bargaining agent is requisite to
achieve the result, i.e., if a "members only"
contract would be insufficient, then the
legislator would be under a moral duty to
provide the statutory basis for an exclusive
bargaining agent. 26 The answer to the
question involves a matter with which we
have had little experience, and the safer
answer from the moral viewpoint probably
is that if the state is sufficiently industrial-
ized a labor relations statute is required.
Decidedly less simple, however, is the
employer-employee situation in which the
employer competes with other employers
in the product market. In those cases, it is
possible that the competing employer, by
using a lower wage scale can drive the em-
ployer who pays a reasonable wage out of
the market and thus force the latter to lay
off his employees or reduce their wages. It
is in these cases that there is possible a
misuse of the right to work which would
justify an invasion of the right to work by
shop cloture.
The apologists for shop cloture, using
26 The rather absurd decision in Piegts v. Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters, 28 CCH Lab. Cas. 69,242
(La. 1955), would seem to indicate that a labor
relations statute is required. The decision is not to
be taken as a correct construction of the intent
of "Right-to-Work" laws. None of the several
opinions filed by the sitting judges appear to dis-
play any knowledge of the framework of indus-
trial relations. While it is true that there is an
abridgement of the right to work where there is
an exclusive bargaining agent, the abridgement is
independent of membership or non-membership in
a union, i.e., the rates and conditions apply to
all regardless of union membership. If the union
had demanded a "members only" contract, would
the Court have found that it sought to make union
membership a condition of enjoying the contract
benefits?
the classical appraisal of the labor market
furnished by Adam Smith and Karl Marx
-a tremendous oversimplification -jump
to a conclusion at this point by a rough
sorites which runs:
(Practically) all employers are in
competition.
Employers in competition cut wages.
Wage cutting is prevented by shop
cloture.
Ergo: Shop cloture of all employers
is justified.
Now the fact is that there are a number
of occupations and industries where that
sorites would hold true. But the first error
in the sorites lies in its universality. It pre-
supposes that wage-cutting is the sole meth-
od of competition. The second error lies in
the assumption that shop cloture of itself
is a remedy for wage cutting. Let us ana-
lyze these two somewhat related errors.
Unions, for as long as they have existed
in the United States, have had a ready
answer to the wage cutter; it is a good and
sound answer thoroughly in accord with
our American concepts of fair play. What
is more, it was a practical answer and re-
ceived the support of the honorable em-
ployer. The answer to the wage cutter was
this:
We shall set a standard of wages and
related conditions uniform for all employers
and non-discriminatory as between them,
and we shall compel all employers and all
employees to observe that standard.
By the use of this formula the unions
sought to eliminate wage rates as a factor
in competition so that the workingman-
the least able to bear the burden of com-
petition-would escape the brunt of it.
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The general formula was, in practice,
worked out in two ways. The craft union
worked it out on a labor market basis, that
is, it allocated jurisdiction to locals which
set up standards within their respective
local jurisdictions usually based on time
rates; and it made an effort to keep up the
skill level of its members so that they would
be worth the standard rate. 27 This system
required that all workmen of the craft pledge
to work for no less than the standard rate;
that they pledge to work for no employer
who had not agreed to observe the stand-
ard rate and that they pledge to work with
no member of the craft who was not
pledged to observe the standard. 28 The
27 There are some industries characterized by
high labor mobility and a close relationship of
wage rates to "consumer competition" between
employers in which the craft union technique is
applied although the labor is not, strictly speak-
ing, a craft, e.g., stevedoring, merchant trucking.
Shop cloture is justified in these cases upon like
principles. Where, however, the mobility results
not from hiring conditions but from mere "turn-
over" cloture is not justifiable in the absence of
competitive conditions which dictate an industry
standard. An example of the latter would be the
sales forces of variety stores where the jobs are
steady but the personnel are not. In the variety
store industry standards would not be feasible, for
the comparative norm "sales volume per em-
ployee hour" relates in very small part to em-
ployee effort, since goods are "merchandized," not
"sold" and wage rates tends to depend upon
rather than determine pricing policy, with some
tendency to vary inversely with price.
28 The craft union method of operation, even
though it involves monopoly and invasion of
the right to work, is regarded by the writer as the
modern analogue of the oft-approved medieval
guild [but see the criticisms of monopoly abuse
in Quadregesino Anno, para. 97, and Rerum
Novarum, para. 74, Two BASIC SOCIAL ENCYC-
LICALS 153, 69 (The Catholic University of
America Press, 1943)]. While the strict industrial
uanion method of operation, a creature of mo-
dernity.,has no ancient analogue, the basic principle
only way to obtain such pledges was to
make the craftsman a union member
wherefore their understandings with the
employers required the employer to hire
none who were not so pledged, i.e., none
but union members. This was the origin of
the closed shop. Observe that it is tied in
with the maintenance of a standard; it has
neither point nor purpose when the stand-
ard is removed. Observe, too, that the
standard is the device whereby the moral
right of employees to resist wage cutting is
enforced; hence, if the standard falls, the
moral justification for the closed shop falls.
Being based on the "labor market" the-
ory, the craft union has sometimes a very
close and sometimes a very nebulous rela-
tion to competition between employers. It
is obvious, of course, that if two competing
contractors are handed a blueprint for the
construction of a brick wall and asked to
quote a price they will be faced with the
situation that the brick will cost about the
same for each bidder, so will the mortar,
wherefore the labor cost will be about the
only factor of differentiation and the temp-
tation to cut the wage will be great. Even
where a union has set a standard in such a
case, various techniques such as the em-
ployment of "pacers" and production
bonuses are used to lower the unit cost. On
the other hand, the newspaper printers fol-
low the craft system although there is
would appear to be the same as that of the guilds;
they may be (the writer has some doubt) speci-
fically approved in Quadregesimo Anno, op. cit.
supra at para. 92, p. 149. Unions following the
"heterogeneous contract policy" present no such
problems; negatively, they do not need justifica-
tion as institutions against the charge of monopoly
and affirmatively their operational resemblance
to the guilds is so faint that it cannot be inferred
that the "closed shop" of the guilds is justified in
such unions.
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hardly any relation between the "mechani-
cal labor cost" and the "price structure" of
a newspaper; advertising revenue and sub-
scription revenue are influenced primarily
by circulation which is a reflection of edi-
torial work and not of mechanical work.
There is a tendency in this situation for
the employer least able to pay to furnish
the standard for the craft, and the more
prosperous newspaper* thereby reaps an ad-
ditional benefit; it is, therefore, somewhat
difficult to see why the unions do not fol-
low the heterogeneous contract policy. The
principal reason why this policy is not fol-
lowed appears to be that the members
deem it more to their long term advantage
to put a uniform price on the skill rather
than risk a depreciation of the skill for the
sake of what may be a short term advan-
tage.
The formula was worked out in a some-
what different way by the strict (as opposed
to loose) industrial union. This type of
union was invented, as its name indicates,
to remove wage rates as a competitive fac-
tor in a specific industry such as coal or
garments. This involved, among other
things, organization of all the significant
competing firms in that industry. Instead
of operating on a labor market basis, it
operated on a product market basis, i.e.,
it sought to organize all the shops wherever
located pouring goods into the specific
product market. In each shop it organized
those employees regardless of skills whose
work figured directly in the labor cost of
the product. It soon discovered that in
many cases the most convenient way of
eliminating wages as a factor in product
competition was to put as many elements
of the working force as possible under a
piece rate, rather than a time rate basis,
and to make that piece rate uniform for all
employers. Thus the unit labor cost of each
competing employer would be approxi-
mately equal. With such a control it found
that, unlike the craft union, it did not need
a closed shop; its system was a system of
shop control rather than of job control.
Therefore the union shop, rather than the
closed shop became a fixture of the indus-
trial union. But the union shop arrange-
ment involved disciplinary control by the
international union, which (not the locals)
set the standard, so that no local could, by
special arrangement with the employers of
its own members, render the standard in-
effective and throw the product market into
chaos by permitting the favored employer
to cut prices to his customers. Observe
here, too, that the standard is the device
whereby the moral right of employees to
resist wage cutting is enforced; hence, if
the standard falls, the moral justification
for the union shop falls.
But how many unions today are con-
cerned with either craft standards or in-
dustrial standards? Certainly a minority,
whether judged by the yardstick of num-
bers of unions or of numbers of members.
Apart from the craft unions in the print-
ing and construction trades and the coal
miners and garment workers on the indus-
trial side, it is difficult even to think of
unions maintaining standards. Most unions
today are concerned only with making con-
tracts with the individual employer and
these tend to preserve (pattern bargaining)
rather than to abolish differentials between
competitors.
Most unions, therefore, lack a moral
justification for either the closed shop or
the union shop, and, therefore, the legisla-
tive grant to them of powers of shop cloture
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is immoral. However, the denial of shop
cloture powers to the unions which can and
do maintain standards, which though a
minority are by no means a small minority,
on the grounds that employees should have
the right to bargain with their respective
employers is also immoral as an exaltation
of the derivative right of collective bargain-
ing over the right from which it immedi-
ately derives, the right to a reasonable
wage.
In a "damned-if-you-do- damned-if-
you-don't" situation such as this, the judg-
ment of the legislator is in the class of pru-
dential judgments; the moral factors are
about evenly balanced. For a prudential
judgment made in good faith no legislator
is subject to moral criticism. The legislator
would, of course, have the moral obligation
(since insufficient facts are now available)
to work for an investigation of the practi-
cal questions involved in the legitimate
claims of the craft and strict industrial
unions to shop cloture. For the reasons
that will be explained below, the writer
would be inclined, at the moment, to vote
for the "Right-to-Work" law now and con-
duct the revisory investigation thereafter;
this partly for the reason that while we are
on an economic plateau, the pressures
against the craft and strict industrial unions
are not serious. But if someone thought it
should be done the other way around he
would not be subject to criticism on moral
grounds.
We have noted the fact that most unions
today, instead of maintaining standards,
follow a heterogeneous policy. Since we
have made the point that shop cloture is
not of itself a remedy for wage cutting it
is of some importance to demonstrate the
reasons behind the heterogeneous policy.
The answer may be summed up in the
simple statement that the unions do not
set standards because they cannot set
meaningful standards and they cannot set
meaningful standards because competition
is not the simple thing the classical econ-
omists appraised it as. Price is not the
sole element of competition; value, design,
service, reputation and other elements en-
ter into it. Nor is price governed by wage
rates save in a limited number of competi-
tive situations; in most industrial situations
the wage rate is merely one of the several
factors including method or process, tool-
ing, adaptability of available materials and
management efficiency in labor utilization
which enter into the labor cost. It not in-
frequently happens that the employer with
the highest wage rates operates at or near
the lowest labor cost.
What meaning would standards have, for
instance, in the automobile industry? At
one competitive cycle of that industry the
Ford V-8 was competing in the same price
range with Chevrolet and Plymouth both
of which were powered by straight six en-
gines. Ford had to manufacture a compli-
cated engine block and two heads whereas
its competitors had a relatively simple
block and a single head. On the other hand,
Ford was using a distributor driven by a
simple axial extension of the crankshaft
whereas competitors had distributors actu-
ated by a complex drive through transverse
shafting. Here was a keen competitive situ-
ation; yet the wage rates were an incom-
mensurable factor in that situation. What
point would it serve, assuming the tooling
was relatively simple, to have the machinist
who might be making the spot facings on a
Ford block which, being angular, would be
more difficult, receive the same time wage
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rate as his opposite number in Chevrolet or
Plymouth who had simpler facings in fewer
number? And to attempt to standardize by
the piece rate method in this situation
would be fantastic; assuming the cylinder
heads to be forged would you standardize
by paying the Ford hammersmith at half
the rate per head paid to Chevrolet and
Plymouth hammersmiths - since two Ford
heads were the competitive equivalent of
one competing head?
Nor is this more than a fragment of the
total problem. Suppose one competitor de-
cides to forge his heads and another to cast
them? Suppose one competitor develops a
multiple spindle machine capable of doing
all the spot facings on the block in one
operation? Or suppose one competitor is
able to organize his assembly line more
efficiently than the rest? What then?
To produce competitive parity of labor
cost in the automobile industry the union
would have to start with the allocation of
the competitor's capital, control his plant
layout, his tools, dies, jigs, fixtures and
conveyors and it would have to design his
product for him and specify his manufac-
turing methods. No union is either capable
or desirous of assuming such power or the
responsibility that would go with it. And
if some union were to try such controls to
produce competitive parity, the industry
would be standardized into stagnation.
So it is with the major industries of the
country. Steel, other basic metals, metals
fabricators, mass production generally,
cannot be fitted into the wage formula of
either the craft union or the strict industrial
union. The unions in these fields directly
recognize the facts of their particular in-
dustries by adopting the heterogeneous
contract policy under which a different
contract is made with every employer with
whom they deal, suited to his particular
situation. Indirect recognition of the same
facts is accorded by the tolerance the
unions show for such devices as job evalu-
ation 29 and incentive (as distinguished from
"piece rate") plans. Indirect recognition is
also found in the tendency of these unions
toward "pattern" bargaining which tends
to perpetuate rather than abolish differ-
ences between competitors.
The industries mentioned above, how-
ever, are not the only industries where the
methods of craft and strict industrial union-
ism are inapplicable. In some industries the
ratio of labor cost to selling price is so low
that there is little competitive significance
attached to wage levels, e.g., in paper con-
verting the ratio is about 15% requiring
about seven cents wage differential to pro-
duce an effect of one cent on the price.
Other industries, such as electric power,
do not present competitive situations at all.
Some companies produce premium priced
goods and compete on a quality rather than
a price basis.
The maintenance of a wage standard
would seem to require either a relative
homogeneity of skill in a relatively active
labor market or a relatively homogeneous
29 The factor comparison method is frankly intra-
mural. The point method, starting with externally
erected and valued job element standards origi-
nally had some notion of comparing companies
who competed in the labor (not necessarily the
product) market on the basis of the ratio of points
to dollars. A. L. Kress, protagonist of the system,
stated to the writer that, beyond a small group
in Milwaukee which exchanged wage informa-
tion on a point ratio basis, the employers dis-
played little interest in such comparison. The
inference is that the comparison had too little sig-
nificance in the competitive side of operations.
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product produced by hand or by man-
paced 30 machine without substantial proc-
ess variations accompanied by a wage ratio
competitively significant and a wage struc-
ture capable of being made commensur-
able. 3 1
Now the bearing of all of this on the
moral question lies in the consequence that
shop cloture in such industries, if granted,
would accomplish nothing toward protec-
tion of the wage rates and standards of the
personnel of the industry simply because
there are no standards and none can be
erected by the unions. Whatever protection
can be accomplished is accomplished by
the ordinary exclusive bargaining agency
contract binding the particular employer
and his particular employees. Therefore,
the grant of shop cloture would be the
grant of a power arbitrary because unre-
lated to the accomplishment of the reason-
able ends of the union. An invasion of the
right to work by the grant of such a power
would be immoral.
There is a further reason why shop clo-
ture powers in these "heterogeneous con-
tract" industries might be offensive to mo-
rality. There is a doctrine of the moral law
roughly comparable to our political notions
of "states rights" and "home rule." This
moral doctrine is generally called the "prin-
ciple of subsidiarity." It has been stated
thus:
... it is an injustice ... a grave evil and dis-
30 E.g., a sewing machine, a potter's wheel, a
mucking machine.
31 Some artificial devices are used, e.g., price-wage
stratification under which "popular priced" mer-
chandise is produced at a lower wage rate than
premium goods; averaging travel time in mining,
or mining "face to face"; machine-hand loading
differentials.
turbance of right order to assign to a greater
and higher association what lesser and sub-
ordinate organizations can do. 32
The vesting of a mechanism of control,
such as shop cloture, in a body larger than
the actual bargaining unit would be a vio-
lation of this principle, unless special rea-
sons justifying interference with autonomy
exist.
Barring some novel or really extraordi-
nary circumstances, 33 there are 'two forms
of activity which might be advanced as rea-
sons for a broader control. The first of
these is so-called "pattern bargaining."
While limitations of space prevent a full
examination of "pattern bargaining" it may
safely be said that a strike for the sole pur-
pose of enforcing a pattern (as distin-
guished from a strike to uphold a standard
and as distinguished from a simple wage
strike) would not be morally justified. The
second activity which might be looked to
as furnishing a reason for a broader con-
trol is what might be called the "anti-pub-
lic strike" in which by shutting off the pub-
lic supply of a given product or service the
union tries to force government interven-
tion. While the incidental infliction of harm
upon the public in the course of activity
directed against the employer is justifiable
if not excessive, it is plainly immoral de-
signedly to injure a "non-combatant" to
force him to take action against the oppo-
nent. Thus while an industry-wide strike
against all commercial coal operators is
justifiable, since a common standard is in-
volved, an industry-wide oil or steel strike
32 Quadregesimo Anno, op. cit. supra note 28 at
para. 79, p. 141.
33 Cf. National Ass'n. of Window Glass M'frs. v.
United States, 263.U.S. 403 (1923).
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would be immoral. Also it may be incum-
bent upon the miners to separate the cap-
tive from the commercial mines in timing
strikes.
Since neither reason will support a union-
wide control there would be apparently a
violation of the principle of subsidiarity. It
might be appropriate at this point to note
that a great deal of the sentiment in re-
sponsible quarters favoring shop cloture is
tied in with the notion that industry-wide
bargaining is a goal to be sought after;
some adherents of this notion regarding it
as an advance toward a "corporative soci-
ety." Assuming that we need a society more
corporate than it is (the craft and the true
industrial unions with their respective em-
ployer groups constitute corporate ele-
ments) no element of it can be larger than
the need which brings it into being, if the
principle of subsidiarity is to be observed.
Hence, there is no warrant for shop cloture
in advance of the formation of the larger
element. European industry-wide bargain-
ing may be justified by European carteli-
zation, but American competition justifies
the heterogeneous contract policy unless
labor standards are involved. Heterogeniety
removes this justification for shop cloture.
Before concluding the discussion of the
question of comparative rights, it might be
well to note that in our discussion of
"standards" we have been talking primarily
about money standards and the industrial
practices closely related thereto. There are,
however, a few specialized situations in
particular industries where standards which
are not money standards will be of suffi-
cient importance to justify shop cloture.
Among such special situations might be
mentioned the "road show" and rehearsal
rules of the theatrical business designed
primarily to protect the performer against
the insolvency or failure of the venture.
Such situations must be considered by the
legislator in passing judgment on the
"Right-to-Work" laws.
On the other hand, there are claims made
on behalf of shop cloture on the ground
that unions need disciplinary powers to en-
sure that their members will not, in collu-
sion with an employer, violate a contract.
An instance typical of those cited in sup-
port of such claims is that of a union mem-
ber who works as a shipwright in the ab-
sence of a firewatch. It seems sufficient to
remark that the union has its remedy
against the employer by contract and that
there is nothing in the law which prevents
it from writing into its contracts a provi-
sion for the suspension or discharge of the
offenders. Such claims will not justify any
general invasion of the right to work.
We have now established the proposi-
tion that on the basis of comparative right
none but the unions operated on the craft
and the strict industrial methods can justify
shop cloture and a grant of such powers to
all unions would be immoral. We have also
established the proposition that unions op-
erated on craft and strict industrial lines
can justify, on the basis of comparative
rights, some degree of shop cloture. It re-
mains to be considered whether the abuses
of shop cloture noted in the forepart of this
article are possibly so great as to preclude
its use. Popularly put: Is the cure worse
than the disease?
Let us first observe that the device of
shop cloture is broader than is justified by
the end it seeks to accomplish. A mere
commitment to observe a standard is a suf-
cient pledge to accomplish the legitimate
end of the union, and if the obligation
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stopped there (with the added requirement
of dues payment) none could question its
reasonableness. But the writer has before
him a union constitution in which the pen-
alty for working under scale is $25 for the
first offense, $75 for the second and expul-
sion for the third, and that same constitu-
tion permits (the "trials" are now in prog-
ress) the expulsion of a man for having
testified in the criminal prosecution of a
union official. It is certainly a topsy-turvy
concept which treats an offense tending to
defeat the primary end of an organization
more lightly than an offense in the nature
of lese majeste. A conscientious legislator
might well trim such powers down to size
before voting for shop cloture.
Next let us note that both the craft and
the strict industrial methods are methods
of monopoly.3 4 A standard which necessi-
tates monopoly and shop cloture is quite
useless (in any legitimate way) to a craft
or industrial union unless the road is left
open to the union to seek a monopoly via
the shop cloture device.
That the legislature should permit such
monopolistic activities by unions is, mor-
ally speaking, quite clear; for in no other
way than by the maintenance of a standard
is the union able to protect the worker
against the fly-by-night employer and his
employees. 3 5 For like reasons, most legis-
34 The publicists of the employers and unions in-
volved in the maintenance of standards avoid the
word "monopoly"; they say that the industry has
been "stabilized."
35 Quebec has sought to solve this problem by
legislation making the craft union contract scale
(prevailing rate theory) the legal minimum wage.
The writer is not sufficiently acquainted with the
actual operation of the statute to know whether
it furnishes adequate protection, but if it does, it
would probably destroy pro tanto the justification
latures have permitted similar business mo-
nopolies; the example most comparable be-
ing that of the insurance rating bureaus,
which fix tariffs to ensure adequate pre-
miums and, hence, solvent insurance. It is
certainly as much a proper legislative con-
cern that a man receive an adequate wage
as that his insurance carrier be solvent.
But wherever legislatures have affirma-
tively permitted monopolescent practices
they have been careful to lay down a set
of protections for those falling under the
power of the monopoly. Their rates and
services are required to be, for example,
"reasonable, adequate and non-discrimina-
tory." Such restrictions on monopoly are in
accord with moral principle. And it is at
least as important that a monopoly which
may "charge a man his livelihood" be prop-
erly regulated as that a monopoly which
may charge a man a slightly higher tele-
phone bill or gas bill or insurance premium
be regulated.
Before granting a labor monopoly, the
legislator is under a moral duty to inquire
whether that monopoly should be restrained
in its power to damage the worker, the em-
ployer and the public, and to enact such
qualifications into the grant as will give
adequate protection, so far as can be legis-
lated practically, to those who may be the
victims of monopolistic oppression. Should
a union be limited in the grounds for re-
for both monopoly and shop cloture. For both
practical and constitutional reasons American
legislatures desirous of experimenting along these
lines to avoid or limit the necessity for shop
cloture might try expedients milder than the
Quebec scheme, e.g., making the craft rate of all
contracts of employment, waivers to be in writing
and signed by the employee to be charged. The
problems of territorial and trade jurisdiction
would have to be reduced to certainties. Connally
v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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voking membership? Should a union be re-
quired to prove those grounds in a tribunal
of the state, rather than in its own tribunal?
Should a union which functions in the hir-
ing field be required to serve its members
without discrimination? Should a union be
required to serve without discrimination
employers who agree to its standards? 36
Should a union be permitted to deprive the
public of the benefits of technological ad-
vance? 37 These are some of the questions
upon which the conscientious legislator
would inform himself before affirmatively
authorizing a monopoly. No adequate leg-
islative studies of these questions have been
made.
Now" for some conclusions practically
applied to the legislative forum:
36 The results in Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821
(1954), and Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y.
164 (1954), are morally indefensible.
37 Opera on Tour v. Weber, supra, note 23, reaches
a correct result by a very circuitous and somewhat
fortuitous route. The route should be shortened.
1. If the "Right-to-Work" law is pro-
posed in statutory form, it is probably
better morally to vote for it; the rights
of the greater number are preserved.
2. If the proposal is in constitutional
form, it is probably better morally to
vote against it unless it can be
amended to give subsequent legisla-
tures the right notwithstanding, to
permit unions which establish stand-
ards among competitors to require
membership in such unions or con-
formity to standards as a condition of
employment, subject to such limita-
tions and qualifications as the legis-
lature may deem appropriate. If such
amendment can be procured, it is
better to vote for the bill.
3. In any case, the moral obligation of
the legislator to seek proper organic
law under which the legitimate ends
of craft and strict industrial unions
may be served, remains.
